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Scientific Conventions, Ethics

and Legal Institutions
Carl F. Cranor*
Introduction
In the early 1970's Congress passed a number of environmental
health laws that required federal executive branch agencies to take a
prospective approach in trying to prevent health hazards from arising as
a consequence of exposure to toxic substances. 1 Many, but not all
these statutes permit (and some may require) that the agencies establish
risks likely to be presented by exposure to toxic substances in the
environment, and, then in accordance with the authority of the statute in
question, to regulate those risks. 2 Largely at the instigation of William
Ruckleshaus of the Environmental Protection Agency, regulatory
agencies began making a distinction for regulatory purposes between
risk assessment and risk management. Risk assessment is the
"characterization of potential adverse health effects of human exposures
to environmental hazards... ".3
* Professor Cranor chairs the Department of Philosophy at the University of
California, Riverside. He has his Ph.D. from the University of California, Los
Angeles and an M.S.L. from Yale Law School.
1 See e.g., section 306 (d) of The Clean Water Act and section 504 of The Clean
Water Act. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amend. of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified at 33 U. S. C. § 1251 (1972)).
2 Some statutes, such as the Delaney Clause [Food Additives Amend. of 1958,
Pub. L. No. 85-929, § 409 (c) (3) (A), 72 Stat. 1784 (1958) (codified at 21 U. S. C.
§ 348 (c) (3) (A))] of The Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, however, may
substantially limit agency discretion.
3
Risk assessments include several elements: description of the
potential adverse health effects based on an evaluation of the results of
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Typically risk assessment is contrasted with risk management which
the National Academy of Sciences indicates is the "process of evaluating
alternative regulatory actions and selecting among them." 4 This
selection necessarily requires the use of value judgments on such issues
as the acceptability of risk and the reasonableness of the cost of
control. 5
Although both the National Academy of Sciences and Administrator
Ruckleshaus draw a sharp distinction between risk assessment and risk
management, one thesis of this paper is that this is an artificial, and, I
believe, an untenable distinction in the present circumstances of
scientific uncertainty of carcinogen risk assessments. In addition, in
many respects the scientific aspects of risk assessment cannot be
separated from essential social policy judgments that are needed to
design and use the scientific data for regulatory and other legal
purposes. Thus, risk assessment is necessarily infected with risk
management kinds of considerations. This in turn should affect our
approach to risk assessment and the law.
epidemiological, clinical, toxicologic and environmental research;
extrapolation from those results to predict the type and estimate the
extent of health effects in humans under given conditions of exposure;
judgement as to the number of characteristics of persons exposed at
various intensities in duration; and some are judged on the existence of
overall magnitude of the public health problem. Risk assessment also
includes characterization of uncertainties inherent in the process of
inferring risks.
ThE NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL

GoVERNMENT: MANAGINGHE PROCESS 18 (1983).
4
This is an agency decision making process that entails consideration of
political, social economic and engineering information with risk related
information to develop, analyze and compare regulatory options and to
select the appropriate regulatory response to a potential chronic health
hazard.
Id., at 18 and 19.

5 Id.
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I
Here I will discuss some of the reasons that the distinctions between
the "science" of risk assessment and risk management are untenable. I
focus on cancer risk assessment for this is probably the most studied
and perhaps one of the most controversial areas of risk assessment; thus
most is known about it.
A. Because of the large numbers of uncertainties in present risk
assessment practices, assessors can dominate risk management
decisions. Cothern, et. al., using different high dose to low dose
extrapolation models for evaluating the results from animal bioassays
show that the predicted low dose results vary by a factor of 106; this
they add "is like not knowing whether you have enough money to buy a
cup of coffee or pay off the national debt." 6 Now the uncertainties
may not be quite so drastic as their comments suggest, for some
considerations of science may suggest at least the more extreme models
may be ruled out,7 but this example does indicate some of the possible
extremes open to risk assessors. Thus, given such possibilities, if risk
assessors say that as a result of their studies, risks are very low, e.g., a
10-6 increase in the lifetime risk of contracting cancer, then risk
managers have no risks to regulate. On the other hand, if because of the
great uncertainty, risk assessors are able to say that the risks are very
high, e.g., greater than 10-3 increased lifetime risk of contracting
cancer, risk managers may have a risk to manage, but the projected risk
may be so high it in effect greatly limits their options.
B. Because of the potential uncertainties involved, others have
argued that risk assessors can smuggle in their policy preferences based
6 Cothern, Coniglio and Marcus, Estimating Risks to Health, 20 ENVTL. SC.
ANDTEOcL 111 (1986).
7 Several federal agencies in their risk assessment policies argue that both
scientific considerations and protection of public health favor adoption of the
multistage high dose to low dose extrapolation model.
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on their own individual judgments. While I think that is a possibility,
the argument of this paper does not rest on this point.
C. However, a more important point is that since there are so many
scientific uncertainties in the assessment of risks, agency scientists have
to rely on inference assumptions to guide their decisions in at least four
different kinds of circumstances: 8
(i)... when the data are not available in a particular case; (ii)
assumptions potentially testable but not yet tested; (iii)
assumptions that probably cannot be tested because of
experimental limitations; (iv) assumptions that cannot be
tested because of ethical considerations.
These assumptions or inference guidelines may reflect not only the
best current guess about the correct science in question, but also social
or political policy considerations, and it seems proper that they do so.
However, when the policy considerations are introduced this blurs the
distinction between the presumably "scientific" and "policy neutral" risk
assessment and the policy laden risk management.
D. Finally, and most important for the purposes of this paper, even
if the uncertainties did not exist and even if many of these inference
guidelines could be replaced by correct scientific theories, there remain
some features of risk assessment that necessarily will beg social policy
questions in certain circumstances; these are a major focus of this paper.
Epidemiology is one tool used to estimate health risks to human
beings from toxic substances. It is often difficult to do good epidemiological studies because there are practicalevidence gathering
problems. 9 Even when there are not, however, theoretical difficulties
8

OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, IDENTIFYING AND REGULATING

CARcINOGENs, 25 (1987).

9

See discussion of this point in Cranor, Epidemiology and Procedural

Safeguardsfor Workplace Health Protectionin the Aftermath of the Benzene Case, 5
INDUS. REL LAW J. 372 (1983).

Cranor: Scientific Conventions, Ethics and Legal Insitutions 159

undermine the policy neutrality of epidemiology and hence the policy
neutrality of this aspect of cancer risk assessment. In particular, for the
relatively rare diseases typical of many cancers and for small sample
sizes, the design as well as the interpretation and use of epidemiological
studies of such diseases depends on the use of controversial moral or
social policy assumptions. Thus, I argue that in order to interpret and
use the science necessary to estimate risks to human beings from
exposure to toxic substances, scientists or the agency personnel
interpreting the studies must incorporate the equivalent of moral or
social policy assumptions as well as appropriate statutory preferences. If
scientists follow their usual conventions in doing statistical studies, they
will beg the legal questions at issue. In order to avoid this, our legal
institutions should be modified in certain ways to take needed policy
concerns into account. This argument is developed by reference to an
elaborate example concerning the use of epidemiology.
1I
Epidemiological studies are classified into experimental 10 ,
descriptive1 1 , and observational studies. Observational epidemiology,
the focus of this discussion, "depends on data derived from
observations of individuals or relatively small groups of people."' 12
Such studies are then analyzed with "generally accepted statistical
methods to determine if an association exists between a factor and a
10 Experimental studies require the "deliberate application of withholding of a factor
and observing the appearance of lack of appearance of any effect." Use of such studies
for purposes of discovering whether exposure to toxic substances can cause health
harms would not be appropriate for obvious moral reasons. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY
AssimENT, CANcER RiSKS 137 (1981).

11 Descriptive epidemiology examines "the distribution and extent of disease in

populations according to basic characteristics - e.g., age, sex, race, etc." These
might provide clues to the etiology of disease which could then be investigated more
thoroughly in other studies. Id.
12 Id.
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disease and, if so, the strength of the association." 13 Of the two
species of observational studies -

cohort and case-control studies -

I

studies. 14

consider only cohort
Cohort studies can be retrospective or
prospective. In a prospective study, a sample population exposed to a
potential disease-causing factor is followed forward in time. Its disease
rate is then compared with the disease rate of a group not similarly
exposed. In a retrospective study, the same method is employed, only
using historical data. Each kind of study has its advantages and its
problems.15 A thesis I have argued in more detail elsewhere 16 is that a
wise and conscientious epidemiologist (or a risk manager using such
studies) with perfect evidence, but with constrained sample sizes for
detecting relatively rare diseases (with a background risk < 10-4),
cannot help but face potentially controversial moral and social policy
decisions in order to interpret an epidemiological study and to produce
the risk numbers that are the outcome of such work.
In trying to determine whether a substance such as a benzene is a
13 Ia

14 In a case-control study:
people diagnosed as having a disease (cases) are compared with persons
who do not have the disease (controls). Clearly, fewer people are needed
in a case-control than in a cohort study, for only those with the disease,
not those exposed to a risk factor, are the objects of examination. In
either case, an association between a risk factor and the disease means
that those exposed will tend to develop the disease and those not
exposed will tend not to develop it. Case control studies are essentially
retrospective. The researcher takes a group that has contracted a disease,
compares the characteristics of that group and its environment with a
nondiseased group, and tries to isolate factors that might have caused
the disease.
J. MAUSNER & A. BAHN, EPIDEMIOLOGY: AN INTRODUcTORY TEXT 312-13, 322-25

(1974).
15 See J. KELSEY, W. THOMPSON, & A. EVANS, METHODS IN OBSERVATIONAL
EPIDEMWOLOGY 128-130 (1986) for discussion of some of these problems.
16 Cranor, Some Moral Issues in Risk Assessment forthcoming in ETHICS
(1990).
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human carcinogen, a scientist considers two hypotheses. The first (the
null hypothesis) predicates that exposure to benzene is not associated
with greater incidence of a certain disease (e.g., leukemia or aplastic
anemia) than that found in a nonexposed population. The second (the
alternative hypothesis) indicates that exposure to benzene is associated
17
with a greater incidence of such diseases.
Since an epidemiological survey relies on statistical samples, by
chance alone a researcher risks inferential errors from studying a sample
instead of the whole population in question. In particular, one runs the
risk of false positives (the study shows that the null hypothesis should
be rejected and the alternative hypothesis accepted when in fact the null
hypothesis is true) designated as a type I error,18 or false negatives (the
study shows that the null hypothesis should be accepted when in fact the
null hypothesis is false and the alternative hypothesis is true), called a
type I error (summarized in the table on the next page). 19
Statistical theory provides estimates of the odds of committing such
errors by chance alone. The probability of committing a type I error is
normally designated a, and the probability of committing a type II error
is designated 3.20 Conventionally, a is set at .05 so that there is only a
one in twenty chance of rejecting the null hypothesis when it is true. 2 1
The practice of setting a =.05 I call the "95% rule", for researchers
want to be 95% certain that when the null hypothesis correctly
characterizes the world, the statistical test will show the null hypothesis
17 A. FEiNSTEIN, CLNIcALBIOSTASTCs 320-21 (1977).
18 Id., at 321-22.
19 Id., at 324-25. Table I is adapted from id., at 325 (Table 1).
20 See generally, id., at 320-34.
21 Walter, Determinationof Significant Relevant Risks and Optimal Sampling
Proceduresin Prospective and Retrospective ComparativeStudies of Various Sizes,
105 AM. J. EPIEMIOLOGY 387, 391 (Table 2) (1977). I do not discuss how the
various statistical variables are derived for a particular study from the raw data but
only wish to show the conceptual relationships among them.
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is correct and is accepted.
TABLE I

Null hypothesis
is accepted.

Null hypothesis
is rejected
(and alternative
hypothesis is
accepted).

Null hypothesis is
actually true,
e.g., benzene is not
positively associated
with leukemia.

Null hypothesis is
false, alternative
hypothesis is true,
e.g., benzene is
associated with leukemia.

No error

Type II error
False negative

Type I error
False positive

No error

Conventional practice is less rigid concerning values for 03, but it is
typical to set

P3 between .05 and .20, when a

is .05. The "power" of a

statistical test is 1 - 3. When 03 equals .20, the power of one's statistical
test is 0.80. This means a scientist has an eighty percent chance of
correctly rejecting the null hypothesis as false when it is false. Choice
of appropriate a and f5 values is guided by one's purposes; often these
are philosophic in nature.
The low value for a for most scientific studies probably reflects a
philosophy about scientific progress and may constitute part of its

justification. 22 By keeping the chances of false positives quite low,
22 The low value for cc may also be a mathematical artifice explained historically.
As Giere puts it:
The reason [for the practice of having a 95% confidence level to guard
against false positives] has something to do with the purely historical
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then when one obtains a positive result one can have considerable
confidence that one's addition to scientific knowledge is not the result of
random chance. In building the edifice of science, by keeping the odds
of false positives low, one ensures that each brick of knowledge added
to the structure is solid and well-cemented to existing bricks of
knowledge. Were one to tolerate higher risks of false positives, take
greater chances of new knowledge being mistaken by chance alone, the
edifice would be much less secure. A secure edifice of science,
however, is not the only important social value at stake.
One can think of ox, 0, and 1 - P as measures of the "risk of error"
or "standards of proof'. What chance of error is a researcher willing to
take? Is a twenty percent (P = .20) chance of saying benzene does not
cause cancer, when in fact it might, an acceptable risk? When workers
or the public may be contracting cancer (unbeknownst to all) even
though a study (with high epistemic probability) shows they are not, is a
risk to their good health worth a twenty percent gamble?
Alternatively, we might think of a, P, and 1 - P as standards of
proof. How much proof do we demand of researchers and for what
purposes? Must potential carcinogens be condemned by mere majority
of the evidence, say somewhat more than fifty percent of the evidence
(e.g., 1 - 3 = .51+)? These questions only precede more complex
matters, for the standards of proof demanded of statistical studies have
implications for the costs of doing them and for the risks that can be
detected. The mathematics of epidemiological studies, together with
small sample sizes and rare diseases for study force serious policy
choices on researchers and regulators alike when these studies are used
fact that the first probability distribution that was studied extensively
was the normal distribution.
GrIRE, UNDERSTANDING SCIETFIC REASONNG, 212-213 (1981).

Two standard deviations on either side of the mean of a normal distribution
encompasses 95% of the entire distribution.
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in regulatory contexts to estimate risks to people.
The trade-offs at stake depend upon two other variables: N, the total
number of people studied in the exposed and unexposed samples, and
8, the relative risk one wants to detect. 23 At the outset of the study, one
might design a study so that 5 is some value considered an unreasonable risk to health for public policy purposes, say a relative risk of 2, 5,
or 10.24 The value chosen depends upon many factors, including the
seriousness of the disease, its incidence in the general population, and
how great a risk, if any, the exposed group justifiably should be
expected to run. 2 5 If one wishes to detect a very small relative risk
between two groups in a cohort study, e.g., a relative risk of 2 for a rare
disease, large numbers of exposed and unexposed individuals must be
studied. A large relative risk, such as a risk of 6, requires fewer individuals to obtain statistically significant results.
The relation between the relative risk and sample size raises a more
general issue. (x,03, 8 and N are mathematically interrelated. If any three
of them are known the fourth can be determined. Because the variables
are interdependent, crucial trade-offs are forced by the logic of the
statistical relations. Consider the hypothetical decision tree (summarized
in Table II) which presents five related alternatives. 2 6 The cohort study
assumes that the prevalence of disease L in the general population is
23 See Feinstein, supranote 17, at 320-324.

24 That is, the incidence of disease in a group exposed to a risk factor would be
two, five, or ten times greater respectively than the incidence of disease in the general
population.
25 To be more precise about this, however, 8 need not be set in advance, for it
depends upon the number of people to be studied and the prevalence of the underlying
disease, in addition to the values of a and 3.
26 The numbers in the first and second alternatives are from Appendix A, Cranor,
Epidemiology and ProceduralProtectionsfor Workplace Health in the Aftermath of
the Benzene Case, 5 INDUs. REL. L. J. 372 (1983).
The numbers in the last three alternatives are from Appendix A of this paper.
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8/10,000. It seeks to detect a relative risk of 3 (8 = 3), provided such
risks exist.27
From Table II, it is not immediately evident which alternative is the
most attractive. Alternatives (1) and (2) would be excluded for reasons
of cost or impracticality because the samples required are simply too
large to be manageable even though these are the most accurate studies.
Alternatives (3) and (4) may put those exposed to toxic substances at
considerable risk, and alternative (5) risks undermining the credibility of
the research because it is inconsistent with scientific practice, since it
violates the 95% rule. The logic of epidemiology together with small
sample sizes and a low background disease rate impose difficult moral
choices on "scientific" research.
Furthermore, some risks may be statistically impossible to detect.
Suppose, for social, regulatory or legal reasons, that it is thought
important to detect a relative risk of 3 among workers exposed to toxic
substances, for a disease that occurs in eight people of every 10,000. If
there were only 1,000 workers to study (with (x at .05 and 3 at .20), a
relative risk could not be detected below 10, even if it turned out the
substance in question did cause a threefold increase in mortality among
28
workers.
Alternative (3) suggests some interesting results for "negative" or
"no effect" studies. Assume a study is run on 2,150 exposed workers
with a at .05 and f3 at .20, when the prevalence of the underlying
disease is 8/10,000. With these values, we only could be confident of
detecting a relative risk of 6. But suppose no relative risk were detected,
that is, the study was "negative" or showed "no effect" between the
chemical C and the disease L. What could we infer? At most we would
be justified in concluding that the relative risk was less than 6. It might
27 The alternatives are numbered in the left hand boxes, with H0 being presented
above H1, in the right hand boxes, for each.
28 This figure is taken from Walter, supra note 21, at 391 (Table 2).
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be 5.8 or 1, but given the constraints on the study, we could not
conclude so statistically. In general, for "no effect" studies the most that
can be inferred is that the relative risk to people in the exposed group is
not as high as the relative risk tested for in the study. 29 Regulatory
agencies regard such results as useful mainly for setting upper bounds
30
on risks to people.
TABLE 1131
1. = 3,

wher ei n t h

negative .95; false negative 20

studsrue

---=.053.owithtu
13= .2
29difficulty
This

a n= .05, 2
o4.
Fr alefalse

io oc5

e.
e poi i c o cve .5r; u e no fie id

r negative .95;false negave .20

" --! false positive .05; true positive
humn9piemolgialstes
negative
aloa.80 plies to5

9, 8 = 3.8

-.3,. 3 .0, =3
Ie t hat t he r el ati ve ris k = not

ru

e ne g a tiv e

.95; false negativ .49
positive .05; true positive .51

neg ativ e .8077 o2d0s
alse positive
7; ftru
ega ti v e .6.33;
false
rue npoitv

29 This difficulty with negative human epidemiological studies also applies to
animal bioassays which are essentially animal epidemiological studies. We should be

similarly skeptical of "no effect" results there.
30 See supra note 8, wherein the policies concerning use of epidemiological
studies are summarized.
31 For alternative 1, n/2 = 13,495.
For alternative 2, n/2 = 7,695.
For alternatives 3 to 5, n/2 = 2,150. With regard to (3) HI , it can only be
inferred that the relative risk is not as high as 6; with regard to (4) H0 that odds are
.49 that exposed subjects will remain exposed to harmful substances; and with regard
to (5)H1 that scientific credibility is undermined.
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As striking as the preceding examples are, they only suggest the
statistical problems a cohort study of a typical environmentally caused
disease (e.g. benzene-induced leukemia), might pose, for they are based
on the assumption that the prevalence of the hypothetical disease L in the
general population is 8/10,000. If the prevalence of the disease were
rarer by a factor of 10, which is typical of leukemia 32, then the
decision tree would exhibit even more extreme results. These are
summarized in Table III.
There, a cohort study is presented in which it is assumed that the
prevalence of disease L in the general population is 8/100,000 and that a
study seeks to detect a relative risk of 3 (8 = 3). Five numbered
alternatives 33 are shown (as in Table II), with H0 and H1 for each.
The upshot is that the rarer a disease, the greater the problems faced
by epidemiologists, and the more acute are the tradeoffs imposed by the
34
mathematics involved.

32 NAIIONAL CANCER INST., DIV. OF CANCER CAUSES AND PREVENTION,
DEMOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS SECIION, SURVEILLANCE, EPIDEMIOLOGY AND END RESULTS:

INCIDENCE AND MORTAIriY DATA 1973-1977, [MONOGRAPH No. 57] 662-63 & Table

51(1981).
33 The numbers for the first and second alternatives are taken from Appendix A in
Cranor, supra note 26. The numbers for the fourth alternative appear, id., at 392,
note 111.
The numbers for the third and fifth alternatives appear in Appendix A of this

paper.
34 The above problems are incident to a cohort study. A case-control study which
looks only at diseased people and compares them with a control group requires fewer
subjects, thus lowering the costs. The trade-offs and statistical difficulties imposed

are exactly the same, however. The trade-offs involved between relative risk and type
II errors mean that either study may conclude that people exposed to potentially toxic
substances face no risk when in fact they do.
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TABLE

I35

true negative .95; false negative .05

,. positive .05; true positive .95
false
4true negative .95; false negative .20
false positve .05; true positive .580
3. a = .05, 1 = .20

=

3

4.cc=.05, P=.A9, 8=3.81

true negative .95; false negative .20

true negative .95; fals negative << .50
false positive .05; true positive << .50

5. =33,0.20 8=
5. =.33
1 = .20 = 3.

true negative .67; false negative .45
_ false FMoiiv33; Rtrue positive 55

I
The moral problems connected with epidemiological studies have
other serious implications. How one interpretsthe fixed data of a study

shows the value laden nature of the study. The fixed data, in a
completed study consists of the background disease rate, sample size
and revealed relative risk. For purposes of interpreting this
information, epidemiologists (or risk managers using their studies)
35 For alternative 1, n/2 = 135,191.
For alternative 2, n/2 = 77,087.
For alternatives 3 to 5, n/2 = 2,150. Also note with regard to (3) H1 that 39 is
the least significant relative risk which the study has .80 power to detect and with
regard to Ho that odds >> .5 that relative risk of 3.8 will not be detected when it
exists. For alternative 5, note with regard to Ho that there is high false negative rate
and with regard to H1 scientific credibility is undermined.
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could vary the values of a and 03. Consider one scenario as an example.
Suppose the study of 2,150 exppsed individuals revealed a relative risk
of about 3, because there were 5 deaths compared with 1.72 (1 or 2) in
the control group. Is this a positive result or not? The following table
shows that one could interpret the study as a positive study for any of
several pairwise choices of a and P3 values.
Any pairwise combinations of a and f0 in the left hand column will
show that the study outcome is positive, for all would show a relative
risk of about 3. Changing the variables slightly as indicated in the right
column will produce a negative study. (We should also note that this
study runs substantial risks of false negatives; these range from 49%
down to 25%.)
Similarly, if the study revealed 6 deaths from exposure to a toxic
substance, which is a relative risk of about 3.5 for an exposed group of
2,150, any pairwise combination of a and 0 values which enabled one
to show a relative risk of at least 3.5 would produce positive results for
the study. Changing the variables slightly would produce a negative
study.
These examples show that epidemiologists, risk assessors and risk
managers have considerable flexibility in interpreting the data of a
study. How they interpret and use the data in certain regulatory and
legal contexts will have important consequences for protecting human
health.

I RISK -Issues in Health& Safety 155 [Spring 1990]

TABLE IV

Positive Results*
a
.10

f3
.49

S
3.0

.15

A0

3.0

.20

.30

3.1

Positive Results*
.25 .25 3.1

Negative Results

When ac<.10 (with 03constant) or
0<49 (with ax constant)
When a<.15 (with 03constant) or
<4O (with a constant)
When a<.20 (with 3 constant) or
3<.3 (with a constant)
Negative Results

When a<.25 (with 3 constant) or
0<.25 (with a constant)

*Least significant relative risk which the test has a power of .51 or higher to detect.
Maximum observable relative risk.

Thus in some common circumstances (indicated above) in which we
use or need to use the statistical tool of epidemiology, and in which
scientific tradition would ordinarily require us to rely upon the 95%
confidence rule, there is a tension between the use of this rule and other
public policy and moral concerns we might have under environmental
health laws. Roughly the tension is between a commitment on the one
hand to traditional scientific caution in pursuit of the truth (represented
in the 95% rule) and a commitment, on the other hand, to protecting
people's health - or at least not taking chances with their health.
However, the same examples show that in the circumstances described
there is no necessity to the received scientific practice - it could be
done differently. Whether statisticians and scientists should be
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committed to the 95% rule in certain contexts is a normative, a policy,
question that depends upon the purposes to which the results will be
put. Thus, it raises substantial philosophical issues.
Second, the reporting of epidemiological data is not obviously a
neutral and objective project. In the example just discussed, sample size
and number of the deaths are fixed data in the study, but whether a risk
to human health is reporteddepends upon the choice of values for a
and P. How the fixed data gets used in subsequent regulatory or legal
proceedings will also -depend upon these variables and may have
important consequences for our health. Whether scientists regard the
study as presenting positive results or not, depends very much on the
choice of values for a and 3.
More importantly, the interpretation of the data is not value neutral,
for, as we have seen above, the choice of values for a and P3
commits
scientists (or those who use their results) implicitly, if not explicitly, to
making judgments that are the equivalent of moral or social policy
considerations. These equivalents of moral considerations must be relied
upon in order to perform and interpret the studies in question. These
choices are illustrated in the decision trees in Tables II and Ill. Thus, in
a world of limited resources, scientists may be faced with a choice of
spending large amounts of money in order to obtain relatively precise
results, results which are scientifically respectable (ax is low) and which
have a small chance of false negatives (P is low) [for alternatives 1 and
2], or a choice of spending smaller amounts of money, but obtaining
results that are not scientifically respectable(alternative 5) or results that
have substantial odds of producingfalse negatives by random chance
[alternatives 3 and 4]. These considerations enter into the design of the
study.
Third, when there is an a - 3 asymmetry in testing large numbers
of substances, there are also problems. As long as a < f0, and a is in
I RISK -Issues in Health &Safety 155 [Spring 19901

the neighborhood of .05, we are doing "better" science conventionally
conceived, but as a matter of experimental design we may also be
protecting possibly harmful chemicals better than human health.
Suppose that we have 2400 substances to test. Assume, to be realistic,
that 40% of those are carcinogens and 36% of them are not, with the
remainder equivocal or inconclusive. 3 6 Now if epidemiologists set c at
.05 and 03 at .20 (fairly typical values), assuming this is a large enough
sample, we will have 192 false negatives and 43 false positives. With
192 false negatives, this means that our test will have falsely indicated
that 192 substances were not carcinogenic when in fact they were.
Thus, 192 substances which pose some risk of cancer to the populace
(and how large a risk this is will depend upon both the prevalence of the
disease, the relative risk associated with the substance, its potency and
the number of people exposed) will not be detected. In addition, 43 false
positives mean that 43 substances will be wrongly regulated (or
possibly banned altogether), depending upon the statutory authority in
question. 37 If substances are banned, the products into which they are
incorporated will be more expensive to produce and market, or we will
be deprived of their use and benefits altogether. If the substances are
merely regulated, they will be more expensive to produce and market.
Should it turn out that the percentage of carcinogens is less than 40%,
the results would have to be similarly modified. 38
36 OFFICEOF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 10, at 137.

37 If a substance falls under the Delaney Clause, supra note 2, and it causes cancer
in one animal species, it will be banned according to a literal reading of the statute.
(However, according to recent FDA interpretations of the Delaney Clause, this may
not be true. If a substance causes a risk of cancer to animals that is so small that it is
a de minimis risk, the FDA will not deem that it falls under the Delaney prohibition.
See Correction of Listing of D & C Orange No. 17 for Use in Externally applied
Drugs and Cosmetics, 52 F. R. 5081 (1987). More recently, the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia has prohibited this FDA interpretation of the
Delaney Clause. If it fell under other statutes, it might merely be regulated, or might
escape regulation altogether, depending on the statute in question.
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The points made above about human epidemiological studies are
also applicable to the statistics of animal bioassays one of the bases of
risk assessment. Talbot Page has shown 3 9 that in a bioassay with 50
controls and 50 experimental animals if the controls have 5 animals with
tumors at a specific site (with 45 tumor free at that site) and 12 of the
experimental (treated) animals have tumors at that site, using Fisher's
exact test, the value for az for these results is .0542. Thus, the results
are not statistically significant if one uses the 95% rule.

However, if one performs a Bayesian analysis on the same data and
uses available prior information that historical controls have a 10%
tumor rate, then one would greatly increase one's suspicion that the
38 How serious a problem is presented by the asymmetry between traditional c and
3 depends in part upon what moral theory you believe to be correct and the numbers
of people exposed to the substance. It also is dependent upon the substances in
question.
We might classify chemicals tested in an epidemiological study in two different
ways: are the benefits provided by the substances comparable to the harms threatened
or not? We might think of the benefits comparable to the harms, when, for example,
one of the benefits promised is the saving of lives (comparable to the harm threatened
by carcinogens which take lives) or the prevention of death. When the harms and
benefits are comparable, then perhaps we should have a greater concern about the
possibility of false positives, for we may lose substantial life saving benefits if we
falsely condemn a substance when an epidemiological study has a false positive
outcome.
Contrast this possibility with the results when we have a substance that does not
promise life saving or death preventing benefits. For example, the Environmental
Protection Agency recently issued an alert on Aiar, a systemic chemical which is
used on apples, peanuts, grapes and a number of other fruits. Its primary benefit in
apples is to prevent them from falling off trees too early, to keep them firm and ripelooking longer, and to delay the onset of rotting. The benefits are almost totally
marketing and profitability benefits with no obvious beneficial health effects at all.
The chief harm posed by Alar is that it may be one of the most potent carcinogens
known, approaching the now banned EDB in potency. In an epidemiological study of
Alar, using a small a value which ensures good science, the risks posed to our health
may be great, because of the carcinogenic potency of the substance, but such risks
might not be detected because of the chances of false negatives.
39 Page, Problemswith P-Values, 2-3 (Manuscript in preparation).
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substance was carcinogenic. 40
The point: on traditional hypothesis testing with scientists using the
95% rule, this substance would be found to have "no toxic effect,"
because the results were not "statistically significant." Thus, use of the
95% rule may tend to give the substance a clean bill of health, although
even statistically there appears to be substantial evidence of toxicity.
This would be a mistake. Raising a, what counts as a statistically
significant effect, would indicate there is evidence that the substance is
toxic. Thus, use of the 95% rule might well wrongly lead to no
41
regulation of this substance.
Since the reporting, interpretation and use of epidemiological and
animal bioassay data are not normatively neutral, and we could change
conventional scientific practices, we should face the use of the 95% rule
in these contexts as a normative question, as a legal and moral question.
The choice of variables in an epidemiological study is a normative
matter.
40

Thus, if our level of suspicion of the chemical's toxicity were a
probability of .33, we would update our suspicion to a probability of
.63, conditioned our observing the result of (5, 12) [tumors in controls,
tumors in treated animals]; or if our initial level of suspicion were a
probability of toxicity of .2, we would raise this probability to .46 on
the basis of the evidence.
Id.
41 There is a generalization to the argument I have been offering. Any specialist (at
least in academic disciplines) is concerned about the validity and defensibility of her
inferences. The 95% rule is a common standard for good statisticalinferences. By
analogy with the arguments about epidemiology, to the extent that scientists are
reluctant to conclude that suspect substances do not cause disease or death because
the inferences cannot be justified on the very best inference standardsfor their
disciplines, a debate whether to regulate or not may be begged in favor of nonregulation. This is most obvious in the case of statistical inferences in hypothesis
testing, for the chances of false positives cannot be reduced without increasing the
odds of false negatives. By analogy with the recommendations made above, scientists
should similarly scrutinize other scientific inferences used in risk assessment to see
whether regulatory outcomes are biased by scientific practices. Similarly, the use of
strict scientific inferences in regulatory contexts should be addressed as moral or
social policy questions.
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Consider an analogy in the law. In criminal trials, avoiding
wrongful damage to someone's reputation and well-being is so
important that we impose quite demanding standards of evidence in
order to establish guilt; we want to avoid wrongly inflicting harsh
treatment and condemnation on the defendant (a legal false positive). We
could save money and make proof of guilt easier if we thought it worth
the human costs, but we do not. We have been quite self-conscious in
debating the moral considerations that bear on the design and workings
of the criminal law. The evidence problems in the interpretation and use
of statistical human or animal studies that affect regulations which
protect our health should receive similar treatment. In closing, I indicate
a few of the considerations that bear on the use of such evidence the
regulatory setting.
IV
The 95% rule should not be abandoned in all scientific contexts nor
should it be abandoned in all regulatory contexts. However, since it is
one standard of evidence, designed for certain purposes, scientists and
agency personnel relying upon it should be discriminating in its use. In
clinical trials of a drug in which the goal is to try to discover if a drug
has therapeutic effects, it should be relied upon, for we should not
conduct research endeavoring to add to fundamental knowledge about
biochemical and therapeutic mechanisms which takes coisiderable
chances of incurring false positives. Similarly, when one is conducting
epidemiological research to establish knowledge as a foundation for
further research, one might well want to retain the 95% rule.
In other contexts, however, it is likely there will be reasons for
departing from the 95% rule:
- in preventive regulatory proceedings where the major concern is
the forward-looking prevention of health harm, where there is little
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fundamental research to be gained or upon which to build, and where
the typical burden of proof imposed by the relevant statutes is typically
lower than in the criminal or tort law, agencies should not adhere to
it;4 2
_ in screening substances to try to discover those that pose harms
to health;
and in the tort law where the typical standard of proof is not
nearly as demanding as the 95% rule, perhaps courts should tolerate
43
such departures.
The point of these suggestions is that the law should carefully
scrutinize any commitment to "scientific" standards of proof when using
statistical studies, for such a commitment may beg the social policy
questions at issue. Further, the appropriate standard of evidence to be
applied in such cases should be dictated by the appropriate legal
purposes and the applicable law (or wider social considerations).
V
In closing, I suggest some possibilities for regulatory law. First, I
noted in section I that in doing cancer risk assessment, agencies must
make decisions under conditions of substantial uncertainty. Second,
some of the inference guidelines used to guide the decisions under
42 For example, regulatory agencies may nominate substances to the National
Toxicology Program for testing simply because they appear to pose health risks. The
testing that is done under this program is aimed at regulatory purposes, and while
some additional basic research may be obtained from the results of such tests, that is
not the primary aim. (Although the research done under this program is typically
experiments with animals, similar arguments would apply as we have seen above.) In
fact, if the arguments of this paper are correct, perhaps regulatory agencies should not
require adherence to the 95% rule for their purposes.
43 Typically, the tort law requires for successful prosecution of a case that the
plaintiff support his position by a "preponderance of the evidence." If this could be
quantified, it appears to mean that more than 50% of the evidence favors the plaintiff
- some place the estimate as high as 65%.
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uncertainty are themselves chosen partly on policy grounds (section I).

Third, the bulk of the paper (sections I-IV) has been devoted to
indicating the mathematicalincompatibilityof simultaneously protecting
against small chances of false positives and false negatives, the
mathematical impossibility of both doing good science and good
regulation when scientific evidence depends upon the statistics small
samples. Thus, adherence to scientific standards of evidence in such
cases may well beg the regulatory questions at issue before an agency.
Because of the observations in the above paragraph, there are
reasons to use policy considerations to help guide agencies in
addressing these problems. There are several sources of such policy
considerations. A number of authors have suggested that the statute
from under which an agency derives its authority ought to guide risk
assessment choices and decisions under conditions of uncertainty and
in the choice of inference guidelines. 44
Hattis and Smith are typical. In proposing risk assessment
guidelines they indicate that:45
... the guidelines must allow the analyst to select the
particular form for expressing such uncertainty as may be
relevant for choices under a specific statute.Under a
risk/benefit balancing type of statute, the full probability
density function for all sectors of the exposed population
may be relevant to the decision-makers' choice, whereas
only an "upper confidence limit" (at some defined probability
level) for a select "sensitive subgroup" within the population
may be relevant under a statute that requires the decisionmaker to assure that the standard will "protect public health
with an adequate margin of safety."
In addition, in regulatory contexts, the extent to which one might
44 See Hattis & Smith, Jr., What's Wrong With Risk Assessment? in
QUANUTAnVE RISK ASSFsSMENT 95 (J. Humber & R. Almeder eds. 1986) and Latin,
Good Science, Bad Regulation, and Toxic Risk Assessment, 5 YALE J. REG. 89
(1988), for two sets of authors who hold this view.
45 Hattis & Smith, supra, at 95.
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depart from the 95% rule in interpreting scientific evidence (and in
distributing the costs of false negatives and false positives) should also
be guided by the extent to which a statute explicitly mandates health
protections. The more a statute requires health protections, the greater
46
the departures from the 95% rule seems permitted (or even required).
The Delaney Clause of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (prohibiting
direct food additives that cause cancer in humans or animals) and the
hazardous substances section of the Clean Air Act might require greater
departures than some other statutes. A much less demanding standard
seems imposed by the health protections of the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide and Rodenticide Act which requires that the use of pesticides
not generally cause "any unreasonable risk to man or the environment,
taking into account the economic, social and environmental costs and
benefits of the use of any pesticide. ''4 7 This statutory language
suggests that economic and other social costs may be balanced against
potential health harms in deciding whether to permit a substance into
commerce. Explicitly permitting wider social and economic costs to
outweigh threats to health suggests that regulations under such a statute
will be less protective than those under more risk averse statutes.
In addition, agencies can resort to statutory language to assign
burdens of proof for evidence of causation. For this purpose it appears
that regulatory agencies typically do not operate under as nearly
demanding burdens of proof as those that exist in the criminal law or
perhaps as demanding as those that exist in the tort law, for some
statutes 48 seem to permit a lesser standard of proof and most others
46 Although it is not entirely clear why use of the 95% rule should be the default
baseline from which departures should be argued for regulatorypurposes. The 95%
rule constitutes conventional scientific practice, but given the regulatory effect this
rule can have, perhaps it should not be the default baseline.

47 7 U.S.C. § 136 (bb) (1982).
48 For example, the Occupational Safety and Health Act permits OSHA to regulate
even when such regulations are on the "frontiers of scientific knowledge." However,
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have to be administered under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard of
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).49 The appropriate burden of
proof, however, is imposed by the statute in question or implicitly by
the APA - or court interpretations of the statute or the APA. Because
of the lower burdens of proof under regulatory statues than in the tort
law, for example, agencies should have less demanding standards of
evidence for causation than the 95% rule used in peer reviewed journals.
Some authors have suggested further neutral considerations (that
is, a consideration that is neutral between persons' views about the right
outcome for regulation) for guiding risk assessments. 5 0 These include
agencies' adopting policies consistent with (but not required by) the
statutes in question, 5 1 avoiding the potential for catastrophic
miscalculations, 52 and examining the effectiveness (on grounds of cost
and other considerations) of their own programs so as to achieve the
maximum protection per agency cost and effort. 5 3 In addition to these

considerations, agencies should also be cautious about releasing subthe recent Benzene case may impose a somewhat more demanding burden on the
agency. Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, 448
U.S. 607 (1980).
49 The "arbitrary and capricious standard" suggests that if an agency has not been
arbitrary and capricious in interpreting evidence before it, it has wide discretion to act,
possibly even though evidence does not measure up to the standards of evidence
currently accepted in scientific disciplines.
50 Latin, supra note 44, is typical in this regard but is not the only author to
propose such strategies.
51 Cranor, Epidemiology And ProceduralProtections For Workplace Health
ProtectionsIn The Aftermath of the Benzene Case, 5 INDUS. REL. L. J. 372, 396399 (1983).
52 Latin, supra note 44, indicates this includes consideration of evidence of
"widespread population exposures," "absence of a long historical record of
exposures," and "evidence of unusual potency." (1d., at 139-141). I would add other
considerations to this: evidence of substances that were particularly'potent' in the
environment because they have a long half-life, poor absorption rate in the soil, or
are otherwise relatively inert in the environment but not in human or animal
biologicalsystems.
53 Latin, supra note 44, at 138.
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stances that have problematic properties in the environment: long
degradation half-life, poor absorption rates in the soil, high solubility,
high volitilization, relative inertness in the natural environment but not
with mammals.
Finally, if statutory authority is sufficiently unclear and "neutral"
considerations do not provide sufficiently definitive guidance, risk
assessors can turn to broader moral and social considerations, to guide
risk assessments such as the slogans that the regulatory law should be
protective of the public health, should not risk especially sensitive
subpopulations, etc. Such slogans are not comprehensive moral views
at all, but merely hint at some appropriate moral considerations. More
comprehensive moral views might include the following. A theory that
places great weight on protecting human health, such as a rights-based
theory might, would justify greater health protections, more cautious
risk assessment procedures, and greater departures from the 95% rule in
interpreting statistical studies than would a theory which places less
weight on health protections, such as utilitarianism (the theoretical
foundation of cost-benefits analysis) might. The attractiveness of a
moral view that protects health as a matter of right is that the right to
health care protections cannot be trumped or easily overridden by
general social benefits (such as the costs for consumer goods, the
benefits for the agricultural community or the total national product,
etc.). Utilitarian (or cost-benefit) considerations typically have difficulty
justifying health care protections by means of rights because they
permit general social considerations to override specific individual
protections. The point of this is that when statutory authority and
"neutral" principles for guiding risk assessment choices are exhausted
(ifthey are), agencies may also turn to more general moral and political
considerations similar to these in order to guide their decisions.
A final point. Inescapably statutory guidance, neutral considerations
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and broader moral considerations must be used to guide risk assessment
procedures which threatens the "scientific neutrality" of risk assessment.
This suggestion may invite criticism from the scientific and the
regulatory (or regulated) community. Nonetheless, it seems that such
considerations must be appealed to for the reasons given in this paper.
The only issue is how it should be done. If such considerations are
surfaced, consciously debated, and publicly affirmed and adopted after
debate, in a democracy this is an appropriate (even required) role for
public participation in risk assessment and the regulatory decisions that
affect peoples' lives. Public participation in adopting policy
considerations that guide risk assessment decisions under uncertainty
and that guide the distribution of regulatory false positives and false
negatives seems required if such policy considerations are going to have
the important role they must have in risk assessment. If risk assessment
at present is inescapably permeated with policy considerations, as I have
argued it is, then the policies that guide the process should be the
outcome of substantial public participation as is appropriate in a
democratic form of government.
APPENDIX A
Relative Risk as a Function of Alpha and Beta Values
I
Relative Risk [Rel.Risk] When Disease Rate [Dis. Rate] is 8/10,000
Sample 54
Rel. Risk
Dis. Rate
Beta
Alpha
1 0.05
0.05
8 x 10-4
8.9
2150
2
0.10
7.5
2150
3
0.15
6.7
2150
4
0.20
6.0
2150
5
0.25
5.5
2150
6
0.03
5.1
2150
7
0.35
4.7
2150
54 This is one-half of the total population.
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Alpha
0.05

Beta
0.40
0.45
0.49

0.10

0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
0.49

2150
2150
2150
2150
2150
2150
2150
2150
2150
2150

0.15

0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45

2150
2150
2150
2150
2150
2150
2150
2150
2150

0.20

0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45

2150
2150
2150
2150
2150
2150
2150
2150
2150

0.25

0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20

2150
2150
2150
2150

Dis. Rate
8 x 10-4

Rel. Risk
4.3
4.0
3.8

Sample
2150
2150
2150
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43
44
45
46
47

0.25

0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45

48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56

0.30

57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

0.33

8 x 10-4

3.1
2.8
2.5
2.3
2.1

2150
2150
2150
2150
2150

0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0A0
0.45

5.1
4.1
3.5
3.1
2.8
2.5
2.2
2.0
1.8

2150
2150
2150
2150
2150
2150
2150
2150
2150

0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
OAO
0.45

4.9
3.9
3.4
2.9
2.6
2.4
2.1
1.9
1.7

2150
2150
2150
2150
2150
2150
2150
2150
2150

II
Relative Risk [Rel. Rate] When Disease Rate is 8/100,000
Alpha
Beta
[unexposed]
Rel. Risk
Sample
-5
1
0.05
0.05
8 x 10
65.9
2150
2
0.10
52.6
2150
2150
44.8
0.15
3
4
0.20
38.8
2150
5
0.25
34.1
2150
6
0.30
30.4
2150
7
0.35
26.9
2150
8
0.40
23.8
2150
0A5
21.2
2150
9
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Alpha
10 0.10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

Beta
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45

19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

0.15

28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35

0.20

36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44

0.33

0.20

[unexposed]
8 x 10-5

Rel. Risk
52.6
40.9
34.1
28.9
24.9
21.8
18.9
16.4
14.3

Sample
2150
2150
2150
2150
2150
2150
2150
2150
2150

0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45

44.8
34.1
28.0
23.4
19.8
17.1
14.5
12.4
10.6

2150
2150
2150
2150
2150
2150
2150
2150
2150

0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0A0

38.8
28.9
23.4
19.2
16.0
13.6
11.4
9.5

2150
2150
2150
2150
2150
2150
2150
2150

0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45

28.2
20.0
15.5
12.2
9.8
8.0
6.4
5.1
4.1

2150
2150
2150
2150
2150
2150
2150
2150
2150

